This paper presents a surprisingly simple and efficient reliable broadcast algorithm for asynchronous message-passing systems made up of n processes, among which up to t < n/3 may behave arbitrarily (Byzantine processes). This algorithm requires two communication steps and n 2 messages. (The best algorithm known so far requires three communication steps and 2n 2 messages.)
Computation Model
Asynchronous processes The system is made up of a finite set Π of n > 1 asynchronous sequential processes, namely Π = {p 1 , . . . , p n }. "Asynchronous" means that each process proceeds at its own speed, which can vary arbitrarily with time, and always remains unknown to the other processes.
Communication network
The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous reliable point-to-point network. "Asynchronous" means that a message that has been sent is eventually received by its destination process, i.e., there is no bound on message transfer delays. "Reliable" means that the network does not loose, duplicate, modify, or create messages. "Point-to-point" means that there is a bi-directional communication channel between each pair of processes. Hence, when a process receives a message, it can identify its sender.
A process p i sends a message to a process p j by invoking the primitive "send TAG(m) to p j ", where TAG is the type of the message and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process receives a message by executing the primitive "receive()". The macro-operation "broadcast TAG(m)" is a shortcut for "for j ∈ {1, · · · , n} do send TAG(m) to p j end for".
Failure model Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send a message m to all the processes, can send a message m 1 to some processes, a different message m 2 to another subset of processes, and no message at all to the other processes. Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to "pollute" the computation. They can also control the network in the sense that they can re-order message deliveries at correct processes. A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is also called faulty. Otherwise, it is correct or non-faulty.
Let us notice that, as each pair of processes is connected by a channel, no Byzantine process can impersonate another process (otherwise, no non-trivial computation can be done).
An intersection property
The following lemma states an important property that will be used to prove the reliable broadcast algorithm. distinct processes contains at least 2t + 1 processes. The proof then follows from the fact that any set of 2t + 1 distinct processes contains at least t + 1 non-faulty processes.
Proof of (b). Let us first observe that, when considering integers, "strictly more than
Hence, |Q 1 ∩ Q 2 | ≥ t + 1, from which it follows that Q 1 ∩ Q 2 contains at least one correct process.
Reliable broadcast
The reliable broadcast (denoted RB-broadcast) communication abstraction provides the processes with two operations denoted RB broadcast() and RB deliver(). As in [6] , when a process invokes RB broadcast(), we say that it "RB-broadcasts a message". Similarly, when a process executes RB deliver(), we say that it "RB-delivers a message". RB-broadcast is defined by the following properties.
• RB-Validity. If a correct process RB-delivers the message MSG(v) from a correct process p i , then p i RB-broadcast MSG(v).
• RB-Integrity. A correct process RB-delivers at most one message from any process p i .
• RB-Agreement. Given a process p i , no two correct processes ND-deliver distinct messages from p i .
• RB-Termination-1. If a correct process RB-broadcast a message, all correct processes eventually RB-deliver this message.
• RB-Termination-2. If a correct process RB-delivers a message from p i (possibly faulty) then all correct processes eventually RB-deliver a message from p i .
On the safety properties' side RB-validity relates the output (messages RB-delivered) to the inputs (messages RB-broadcast). RB-integrity states there is no duplication. RB-agreement states that there is no duplicity: be the sender correct or not, it is not possible for a correct process to RB-deliver m while another correct process RB-delivers m ′ = m.
On the liveness properties' side The RB-Termination properties state the guarantees on message RBdelivery. RB-Termination-1 states that a message RB-broadcast by a correct process is RB-delivered by all correct processes. RB-Termination-2 gives its name to reliable broadcast. Be the sender correct or not, every message RB-delivered by a correct process is RB-delivered by all correct processes. It follows that all correct processes RB-deliver the same set of messages, and this set contains at least all the messages RB-broadcast by the correct processes.
Upper bound on t As already indicated, it is proved in [3, 4] that t < n/3 is a necessary and sufficient condition to implement the reliable broadcast abstraction in an asynchronous message-passing system prone to process Byzantine failures.
RB-broadcasting a sequence of messages
The previous definition considers that each correct process RB-broadcasts at most one message. It is easily possible to extend it to the case where a correct process RB-broadcasts a sequence of messages. In the algorithm that follows the identity j of the sender p j must then be replaced by a pair j, sn , where sn is the sequence number associated by p j with the message.
Reliable broadcast algorithm
The algorithm Algorithm 1, which implements the reliable broadcast abstraction, consists of a client side and a server side.
On the client side, when a (correct) process wants to RB-broadcast an application message MSG(v i ), it simply broadcasts the algorithm message INIT(i, v i ). On the server side, a process can receive two types of messages.
• When it receives a message INIT(j, v) (necessarily from process p j as the processes are connected by bidirectional channels), a process p i broadcasts the message WITNESS(j, v) (line 2) if (a) this message is the first message INIT() p i receives from p j , and (b) p i has not yet broadcast a message WITNESS(j, −). • When a process p i receives a message WITNESS(j, v) (from any process), it does the following.
-If p i has received the same message from "enough-1" processes (where "enough-1" is (t + 1), i.e., at least one correct process sent this message, see the first item of Lemma 1), and p i has not yet broadcast a message WITNESS(j, −), as in the previous item p i broadcasts this message WITNESS(j, v). This concludes the "forwarding phase" of p i as far as a message of p j is concerned. -If p i received the same message from "enough-2" processes (where "enough-2" means "more than n+t 2 processes", i.e., the message was received from at least (t + 1) correct processes, see the second item of Lemma 1), p i locally RB-delivers MSG(j, v) if not yet done. This concludes the "RB-delivering phase" of a message from p j , as far as p i is concerned. Let us notice that replacing at line 6 "more than n+t 2 different processes" by "(n − t) different processes" leaves the algorithm correct. As n − t > n+t 2 , it follows that using "more than n+t 2 different processes" provides a weaker RB-delivery condition, and consequently a more efficient algorithm from the message RB-delivery point of view. As a simple numerical example, considering n = 21 and t = 2, we have n − t = 19, which is much greater than the required value 12 (> n+t 2 = 11.5).
Cost of the algorithm Only two types of messages are used (INIT and WITNESS). It is easy to see that the broadcast of a message by a correct process requires two consecutive communication steps (broadcast of an INIT message whose receptions entail at most n broadcasts of WITNESS messages). Not counting the messages that a process sends to itself, a reliable broadcast by a correct process costs (n − 1) messages INIT and at most n(n − 1) messages WITNESS. (As they are not under the control of the algorithm, the messages sent by Byzantine processes are not counted.)
Proof of the Algorithm
Lemma 2. Given any j, a correct process p i forwards at most one message WITNESS(j, −).
Proof The proof follows from the second part of the predicate used at line 2 and line 3. ✷ Lemma 2
Lemma 3. Let p j be a correct process which never broadcasts the message INIT (j, v). If the Byzantine processes broadcast a fake message WITNESS (j, v), no correct process will forward this message at line 2 or line 3.
Proof Let us consider the worst case where t processes are Byzantine, and each of them broadcasts the same message WITNESS (j, v). The proof follows from the predicates of line 2 and line 3 which remains always false. The predicate of line 2 because no correct process receives a message INIT(j, v). And the forwarding predicate of line 3 because, to forward the message WITNESS (j, v), a correct needs to receive it from (t + 1) different processes, and it receives at most t such messages. ✷ Lemma 3 Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 implements the reliable broadcast abstraction in n-process asynchronous messagepassing systems in which up to t < n/3 processes may commit Byzantine failures.
Proof
Proof of the RB-Validity property. Let p i be a correct process that invokes RB broadcast MSG(v) and consequently broadcasts the message INIT(i, v) at line 1. The fact that no correct process RB-delivers a message different from MSG(i, v) comes from the following observation. To RB-deliver a message MSG(i, v ′ ), a correct process must receive the message WITNESS(i, v ′ ) from more than n+t 2 different processes (line 6). But if the (at most) t Byzantine processes forge a fake message WITNESS(i, v ′ ), with v = v ′ , this message will never be forwarded by correct processes (Lemma 3). As n+t 2 > t, it follows from the predicate of line 6 that the content of the message RB-delivered by any correct process cannot be different from (i, v).
Proof of the RB-Integrity property. This property follows directly from the RB-delivery predicate of line 6.
Proof of the RB-Agreement property. Let p i and p j be two correct processes such that p i RB-delivers MSG(k, v) while p j RB-delivers MSG(k, v ′ ). As p i (resp., p j ) RB-delivers MSG(k, v) (resp., MSG(k, v ′ )), it follows from the RB-delivery predicate of line 6 that p i (resp., p j ) received the message WITNESS(k, v) (resp., WITNESS(k, v ′ )) from a set Q i (resp., Q j ) containing more than n+t 2 processes. It follows from item (b) of Lemma 1 that Q i ∩ Q j contains at least one correct process. As a correct process broadcasts a single message WITNESS(k, −) (Lemma 2), we necessarily have v = v ′ .
Proof of the RB-Termination-1 property. Let p i be a correct process that invokes RB broadcast MSG(v) and consequently broadcasts the message INIT(i, v i ) at line 1.
It follows that any correct process p j receives this message. Let us remember that, due to the network connectivity assumption, there is a channel connecting p i to p j and consequently the message INIT(i, v) cannot be a fake message forged by a Byzantine process. Moreover, due to Lemma 3, no message WITNESS(i, v ′ ), with v ′ = v, forged by Byzantine processes, can be forward by a correct process at lines 3-4.
Hence, when p j receives INIT(i, v), it broadcasts the message WITNESS(i, v) at line 2. It follows that every correct process receives this message from (n − t) > n+t 2 different processes and consequently locally RB-delivers the message MSG(i, v) at lines 6-8, which proves the property.
Proof of the RB-Termination-2 property. Let p i be a process that RB-delivers the message MSG(k, v). It follows that the RB-delivery predicate of line 6 is true for p i , and consequently p i received the message WITNESS(k, v) from more than n+t 2 different processes. Due to item (a) of Lemma 1, this means that p i received WITNESS(k, v) from at least (t + 1) correct processes.
Due to the predicate of line 3, it follows that (if not yet done at line 2) each correct process eventually broadcasts the message WITNESS(k, v). As there are at least n − t > n+t 2 correct processes, each of them receives WITNESS(k, v) from more than n+t 2 different processes, and consequently RB-delivers MSG(k, v) at line 7, which proves the property.
✷ T heorem 1
